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DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-JURISDICTION OF UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT-STATE COURT'S
DISCRETIONARY DENIAL OF MOTION MADE ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND DOES NOT DEPRIVE

SUPREME COURT OF CERTIORARI JURISDICTION OVER CONSTITUTIONAL QUEsTIo.-Where

a Georgia trial court and the Georgia Supreme Court declined to grant a motion, though
possessed of the power to do so under State law, and such motion was based upon a
valid constitutional objection, the state court's discretionary decision to deny the motion
did not deprive the United States Supreme Court of jurisdiction to decide the substantive
issue.1

The United States Supreme Court had under review the decision of the Georgia
Supreme Court which rejected a claim of infirmity in a trial court conviction for murder,
based on a constitutional ground raised for the first time in an extraordinary proceeding
after the conviction had been affirmed on appeal.
The procedure by which the jury was selected to try Williams, a Negro, must be
understood for a dear understanding of the case. The names of prospective white jurors
had been placed on white tickets; the names of prospective Negro jurors had been placed
on yellow tickets. A Georgia Superior Court judge selected the tickets from a box, and
after some were excused, 120 were available as jurors to serve during the week Williams
was to be tried. Of the 120, four were Negroes. From a panel of 48 "put upon" Williams at his trial, 13 jurors, including three of the four Negroes, were excused for cause

from the trial. The State peremptorily challenged the fourth Negro, so that no Negroes
served on the jury of 12 which was finally selected to try Williams.
The trial followed immediately, and lasted one day, resulting in a conviction. Williams' court-appointed attorney filed a motion for new trial. The motion was overruled,
and on appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court, judgment was affirmed. Two weeks later,
Williams' counsel filed in the trial court an extraordinary motion for new trial under the
Georgia Code,2 alleging for the first time that Williams had been denied equal protection
of the laws, under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, by
the manner in which the petit jury had been selected, organized, impaneled, and challenged. The dismissal of this motion by the trial court was affirmed by the Georgia
Supreme Court, on the ground that Williams, having failed to challenge the array when
put upon him, had waived any objections to the jury's selection. Affidavits that the
methods used to select a jury could not have been discovered by Williams' counsel "in
the exercise of ordinary diligence" were deemed insufficient to excuse his failure to
challenge the array at the outset of the trial.
Upon appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court, Williams' attorney relied almost exclusively upon the case of Avery v. Georgia3 to support his contention that Williams
had been denied equal protection of the laws. In that case, Avery's jury was drawn
precisely in the manner used in the present case, except that no Negroes appeared on the
list of prospective jurors, and Avery challenged the array when the jury was put upon
him. The challenge was overruled, and on appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed
the judgment on the ground that, because there were no Negroes on the panel, the dif1 Williams v. Georgia, 349 U. S. 375, 75 S. Ct. 814, 99 L. Ed. 1161 (1955).
2 GA. CODE ANN. § 70-303: "... in case of a motion for new trial made after the
adjournment of the court, some good reason must be shown why the motion was not
made during the term, which shall be judged of by the court.... No motion for a new
trial from the same verdict shall be made or received, unless the same is an extraordinary motion or case."
8 345 U. S. 559, 73 S. Ct. 891, 97 L. Ed. 1244 (1953).
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ferent-colored tickets did no actual harm in that instance.4 The United States Supreme
Court, however, reversed this decision, holding that Avery had made out a prima fade
case of an unconstitutional discrimination by showing the use of different-colored tickets
which the State had not rebutted.
While the Avery case was decided more than a month before the amendment to
Williams' formal motion for new trial, his counsel did not rely upon the Avery decision
until some six months later, in his extraordinary motion for new trial.
Due to the factual similarities of the Avery case with the present case, a majority
0
of the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to Williams. Mr. Justice Minton,
dissenting, felt that the Avery case had no bearing on the present case because in that
6
proceeding the challenge had been timely made; and also that the present case had
been disposed of by the Georgia Supreme Court altogether on State grounds, i.e., "the
court is without power to decide whether constitutional rights have been violated when
the federal questions are not seasonably raised in accordance with the requirements of
State law." 7 On oral argument, the State of Georgia agreed that the use of the differentcolored tickets was, in fact, a denial of equal protection in the light of Avery v. Georgia;
but, notwithstanding, Williams still was not entitled to a new trial because of his failure
seasonably to challenge the array. Moreover, the Attorney General of the State
intimated in his brief to the Georgia Supreme Court that another remedy was open to
Williams.
The question before the United States Supreme Court, in view of Georgia's concession, was whether the ruling of the Georgia Supreme Court rested upon an adequate
nonfederal ground, so that the United States Supreme Court was without jurisdiction
to review the Georgia Court.
The majority noted that "a state procedural rule which forbids the raising of federal
questions at late stages in the case, or by any other than a prescribed method, has been
8
recognized as a valid exercise of State power." "Thus," says the majority, "we would
have a different question from that before us if the trial court had no power to consider
Williams' constitutional objection at the belated time he raised it. But, where a State
allows questions of this sort.., to be determined by its courts as a matter of discretion,
we are not concluded from assuming jurisdiction and deciding whether the State court
action in the particular circumstances is, in effect, an avoidance of the federal right."D
The majority established three premises upon which it rested its conclusion that the
Supreme Court did have jurisdiction: First, a State court may not, in the exercise of its
discretion, decline to entertain a constitutional claim while passing upon kindred issues
raised in the same manner. Second, although the Georgia courts do not favor extra10
the Georgia statute does empower
ordinary motions for new trial after judgment,
4 209 Ga. 116, 124, 70 S. E. 2d 716, 722 (1952).
5 See note 1, supra.
6 See note 1, supra.
7 Edelman v. California, 344 U. S. 357, 358-359, 73 S. Ct. 293, 295; 97 L. Ed. 387,
391 (1953).
8 See note 1, supra at 382-83, 75 S. Ct. 814 821, 99 L. Ed. 1161, 1170.
9 Cf. Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U. S. 226, 24 S. Ct. 257, 48 L. Ed. 417 (1904); Abie
State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U. S. 765, 772-773, 51 S. Ct. 252, 255, 75 L. Ed. 690, 701
(1931); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354, 358, 59 S. Ct. 536, 538, 83 L. Ed. 757, 760
(1939); Urie v. Thompson, 337 U. S. 163, 172-173, 69 S. Ct. 1018, 1026, 93 L. Ed. 1282,
1294 (1949); Vandalia R. Co. v. Indiana ex rel. South Bend, 207 U. S. 359, 367, 28
S. Ct. 130, 132, 52 L. Ed. 246, 248 (1907).
10 Parks v. Georgia, 204 Ga. 41, 48 S. E. 2d 837 (1948); Brown v. Georgia, 141
Ga. 783, 82 S. E. 238 (1914); Tyre v. Georgia, 38 Ga. App. 206, 143 S. E. 778 (1928).
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11
them to entertain such motions I (Justice Clark, however, agreed with Justice Minton
that the majority had misconstrued Georgia's law. As they read the State law, the
decisions indicate that the Georgia courts had no power to hear and determine this
12
particular petitioner's extraordinary motion on the merits. ) Third, although generally,
the granting or denying of such motion rests primarily in the discretion of the trial court,
and the appellate court will reverse only if such discretion is abused, there are several
cases where the appellate courts have not hesitated to reverse and grant a new trial in
exceptional cases. 13
The majority conceded that these latter cases involved objections made only to the
selection of individual jurors, as contrasted with the whole panel in the present case,
but they felt that the two situations cannot be distinguished on this ground. As to the
state's rule that an objection to the whole panel must be made by way of a challenge
to the array at the time the panel is put upon the defendant, the majority found in
the decided State cases no declaration that an extraordinary motion is not available in a
proper case for granting a new trial when the objection is to the panel, from which the
inference can be drawn that the Georgia courts have the same degree of discretion in the
"array" cases as in cases involving individual jurors.

Mr. Justice Clark, dissenting from this conclusion, points out that the majority
cites no case where such discretion was exercised on a challenge to the array, and that
not one of the "individual juror" cases, relied on by the majority, is mentioned, much
less distinguished, in the Georgia court's opinion in this case. He considered it fair to
assume that the Georgia court itself considered the two types of challenge to be governed
by entirely different rules, and that, excuse or no excuse, the petitioner had waived his
claim "once and for all."
The majority concluded that since the motion was based upon a valid constitutional
objection, the Supreme Court had jurisdiction. However, the Court declined to exercise
14
this jurisdiction; in reliance on Patterson v. Alabama, the case was remanded for the
Georgia Supreme Court's further consideration. The extraordinary facts of the case, e.g.,
the use of the colored tickets a year after the Georgia Supreme Court condemned the
practice; the fact that a life was at stake; the acknowledgment by the State that Williams had been deprived of his constitutional right; and the opportunity which it was
claimed the Georgia Supreme Court had to designate the appropriate remedy, if any (as
intimated by the Attorney General in his brief to the Georgia Supreme Court), all were
felt to compel a remand.

PROCEDURE-WHERE COURT DEIEs MOTION To DIsmIss AssAULT AcTIoN, IT Is ERROR
TO Dismiss NEGLIGENcE AcTIoN BAsED ON SAms FACTs.-In Flamer v. City of Yonkers,
the New York Court of Appeals has held that where a complaint embraces causes of
action in negligence and in assault based on the same facts, it is error for the trial court
to dismiss the negligence action for insufficiency, and at the same time submit the same
See note 2, supra.
Jordan v. State, 22 Ga. 545 (1857); Moon v. State, 68 Ga. 687 (1882); Cumming
v. State, 155 Ga. 346, 117 S. E. 2d 378 (1923) ; Wilcoxon i. Aldredge, 192 Ga. 634, 637,
15 S. E. 2d 873, 876 (1941).
13 Cf. Wright v. Davis, 184 Ga. 846, 193 S. E. 757 (1937) ; Smith v. Georgia, 2 Ga.
App. 574, 59 S. E. 311 (1907); Crawley v. Georgia, 151 Ga. 818, 108 S. E. 238 (1921);
Doyal v. Georgia, 73 Ga. 72 (1884).
14 294 U. S. 600, 55 S. Ct. 575, 79 L. Ed. 1097 (1935).
11
12
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facts to the jury in the assault action, because both require proof of essentially the
same facts except that assault requires the additional element of intent.1
The facts alleged by plaintiff, and which plaintiff's witnesses testified to, were that
plaintiff's intestate, who had been drinking, became involved in an argument in a tavern.
The barkeeper put in a call to the police, but everything was quiet when the police
arrived. However, the officers approached the plaintiff's intestate, and began beating
him with their nightsticks and fists. He struggled to defend himself. One of the police
officers backed away and reached for his gun. A nephew of the decedent, who was with
him, called to the police officer, saying, "Don't shoot, he's drunk." The officer nodded
as if he understood and while the decedent stood in the middle of the room in a dazed
manner, the officer drew his gun and without any warning took aim and fatally shot him.
The plaintiff, administratix of the deceased, brought an action for wrongful death
against the City of Yonkers, naming the two police officers involved in the shooting as
party defendants. She claimed damages on three causes of action. The first cause of
action was for negligence in making the arrest, the second was for assault, and the third
was against the City alone for having knowingly and negligently employed unreliable
police officers. This third cause of action was dismissed for failure of proof, and no
appeal was taken from the dismissal.
The police officers contended that the plaintiff's intestate was conducting himself in
such a belligerent and threatening manner as to require prompt and drastic action to
subdue him; that in shooting the decedent they used no more force than the circumstances warranted. The defendants pleaded a general denial as to all three causes of
action, and interposed the defense of the decedent's alleged contributory negligence to
the first cause based on negligence.
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, the defendant City moved to dismiss the
first cause on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to state a cause of action, there
being no evidence in support 6f the allegations of negligence, and no proof that the
police officers were engaged in making an arrest. The court reversed decision on the
defendant's motion. At the close of the case, the court granted the city's motion to
dismiss the cause in negligence, on the ground that the plaintiff had not made out a
case, but denied a similar motion addressed to the cause in assault and submitted it to
the jury which returned a verdict for the defendant. The appeal to the Appellate
Division, Second Department, dealt only with the judge's dismissal of the first cause
of action based on negligence. The Appellate Division affirmed, 2 and plaintiff appealed
to the Court of Appeals.
The general rule is that no private action, unless expressly authorized by statute,
can be maintained against a state or municipality for the negligent performance of public
duties imposed on it by law, even if the negligence is gross. 3 New York State, by statute,
has waived its sovereign immunity.4 In carrying out governmental functions, as in this
case, the city is acting under powers delegated from the state,5 and therefore its derivative immunity ceased to exist with the passage of the immunity statute.6 Today in
New York, a municipal corporation, like a private corporation or individual, may be
I
2
3
4
5
6
Dep't

Flamer v. City of Yonkers, 309 N. Y. 114, 127 N. E. 2d 838 (1955).
283 App. Div. 790, 130 N. Y. S. 2d 895 (2d Dep't 1954).
Young v. Worcester, 253 Mass. 481, 149 N. E. 204 (1925).
N. Y. CT. CL. AcT § 8.
Bloom v. Jewish Board of Guardians, 286 N. Y. 349, 36 N. E. 2d 617 (1941).
McCarthy v. City of Saratoga Springs, 269 App. Div. 469, 56 N. E. 2d 600 (3d
1945).
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7
held liable for damages resulting from its tortious acts, and its liability is determined
8
by the same rules of law. There is no immunity to protect any civil division of the
state performing a governmental function, even if the civil division has passed no statute
9
sanctioning that enlarged liability. A municipality may be held liable for a tort com0
mitted by a police officer in its employ, on the theory of respondeat superior;' however, as is the case with any defendant, no cause of action can accrue if the municipality
11
has exercised ordinary and reasonable care.
In negligence actions, the only proof ordinarily required to establish a prima fade
case is defendant's failure to exercise ordinary and reasonable care commensurate with
2
The plaintiff must show that the defendant was negligent, by
the circumstances.'
duty owed to the plaintiff, that the plaintiff was damaged thereby,
legal
some
breaching
3
If he fails to do
and that he (the plaintiff) was free from contributory negligence.'
verdict or a
directed
for
a
ask
or
dismiss,
to
a
motion
so, the defendant may make
14
The plaintiff is entitled to the most favorable inference to be drawn from the
nonsuit.
5
However, this inference must establish some
testimony when such a motion is made.'
specific act of negligence or offer evidence from which a specific act of negligence by the
6
This inference must not be predicated merely upon a
defendant may be inferred.'
bare possibility.17
When, as in this case, a motion to dismiss is made after the presentation of the
plaintiff's case, an issue of law only is presented: where all the facts presented stand
admitted and the plaintiff is given the advantage of every inference that can be fairly
drawn from the facts presented, is an issue of fact presented for the determination of
the jury?'s
In the instant case, the trial court dismissed the first cause of action in negligence
because of the plaintiff's failure to show that the police officers were acting within the
scope of their employment when they came into the tavern and shot plaintiff's intestate.
19
The Appellate Division upheld the decision of the trial court.
The Court of Appeals, in its reversal, held that the plaintiff's failure to show proof
of an arrest was not fatal, since such fact could, by favorable inference, be implied
from the testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses. Whether the officers were or were not
0
The
making an arrest was, as are all other questions of fact, an issue for the jury.
if
ordinary
case,
the
of
circumstances
jury also has to determine, under the particular
care was exercised by the defendant police officers in proportion to the danger to be

7 Lindlots Realty Corp v. County of Suffolk, 278 N. Y. 45, 15 N. E. 2d 393 (1938).
8 Schuster v. City of New York, 207 Misc. 1102, 121 N. Y. S. 2d 735, aff'd 286
App. Div. 389 (1st Dep't 1955).
9 McCrink v. City of New York, 265 N. Y. 99, 71 N. E. 2d 419 (1917).
10 See note 6, supra.
11 Klein v. Town of Pittstown, 241 App. Div. 202, 272 N. Y. Supp. 324 (3d Dep't
1934).
12 Mescher v. Brogan, 223 Iowa 573, 272 N. W. 645 (1937).
13 Shuttleworth v. Crown Can Co., 165 F. 2d 974 (7th Cir. 1948).
14 Sadowski v. Long Island R. R. Co., 292 N. Y. 448, 55 N. E. 2d 497 (1944).
15 Cohen v. Consolidated Gas Co., 137 App. Div. 213, 121 N. Y. Supp. 956 (1st
Dep't 1910).
18 Morris v. Railway Co., 148 N. Y. 182, 42 N. E. 579 (1896).
17 Egan v. Dry Dock, E. B. & B. R. R. Co., 12 App. Div. 556, 42 N. Y. Supp. 188
(1st Dep't 1896).
18 Kraus v. Birnbaum, 200 N. Y. 130, 93 N. E. 474 (1910).
19 See note 2, supra.
20 See note 14, supra.
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avoided and in view of the consequences that might have reasonably flowed from the
neglect. 2 1 The jury was justified, perhaps, in finding for the defendant in the assault
action, since the plaintiff had not proved an intention on the part of the police officers
to do a wrongful act. However, the elements of negligence were inferable, and it was
therefore reversible error not to submit that cause of action to the jury also.

CRMINAL LAw-AGENCy-PoTOGRAPHER WHO PAID SHIP PURSER FOR LIST OF INCOMING PASSENGERS HELD NOT GUILTY OF CRIME OF BaING EMPLOYEE OF ANOTER.-The

Court of Appeals has held, in construing Section 439 of the Penal Law,' that one who
pays a ship's purser to do an act not concerning a matter affecting the ship company's
interest, and not involving discretion in the conduct of the ship company's business, is
not guilty of the crime, defined in the statute, of corruptly influencing the employee of
2
another.
Jacobs, a professional photographer, conceived it to be to his advantage to learn
the names and addresses of passengers debarking from ocean liners at New York City,
in order that he might take and more easily market their photographs in pursuit of his
profession. Lists of inbound passengers containing street addresses of returning residents
of this country, known as passenger manifests, are required by federal statute to be
delivered by incoming vessels to the customs, immigration and public health authorities.
A United States Line purser testified that he accepted from Jacobs ten dollars apiece for
copies of said manifests. In consequence, the photographer had been convicted of violating Section 439 of the Penal Law, making it a misdemeanor to corruptly influence agents,
employees, or servants of another.
The material portion of Section 439 provides that: "A person who gives, offers, or
promises to an agent, employee or servant of another, any gift or gratuity whatever,
without knowledge and conient of the principal, employer or master of such agent,
employee or servant, with intent to influence such agent's, employee's or servant's action
in relation to his principal's employer's or master's business, or an agent, employee or
servant who without the knowledge and consent of his principal, employer or master
requests or accepts a gift or gratuity or a promise to make a gift or to do an act beneficial to himself or to another, under an agreement or with an understanding that he
shall act in any particular manner in relation to his principal's, employer's or master's
3
business, or receive a reward for having so acted . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor."
The crucial question was whether the payment here made to the agent had influenced
him to do an act "in any particular manner in relation to his principal's . . . business,"
as laid out in the statute.
The operation of this section had been partially clarified when the Appellate Divi4
sion, First Department, in People v. Graj, interpreted the words, "particular manner."
In that case, defendant was an agent of a union whose members were employed by a
manufacturer who desired to use members of this union in connection with work in
cities outside of New York City. Jurisdictional disputes arose with the out-of-city
unions. The company paid defendant to travel to these cities and prevent outside unions
from getting recognition as bargaining agents. Although the company benefited from
21

Mink v. Keim, 291 N. Y. 300, 52 N. E. 2d 444 (1943).

1 N. Y. PEN. L. § 439(1).
2 People v. Jacobs, 309 N. Y.-315, 130 N. E. 2d 636 (1955).
3 See note 1, supra.
4 People v. Graf, 261 App. Div. 188, 24 N. Y. S. 2d 683 (1st Dep't 1941).
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this, defendant did it at the union's behest, and acted favorably to the interest of the
union.
The court in the Graf case said: "We think that 'particular manner' as used in the
statute was intended to mean a particular manner which would serve the purpose of the
donor of the money rather than that of the employer, and that the money was given
and accepted with the intention to affect some decision by the employee involving ex5
ercise of discretion on his part with respect to his employer's interest."
In the Graf case, it was clear that the employer's interest was not affected in the
sense that the agent was not influenced to do an "act in any way inconsistent with his
6
duties toward the employer,"1 because "defendant acted favorably to the interests of the
7
union." In addition, no decision by the employee involving exercise of his discretion
with respect to his employer's interest was influenced, since the employee acted "at
the behest of the union,"s as well as on the inducement of the company.
The facts of the present case are not as clearly outside the scope of the statute as
were those of the Graf case. Here, the employer did not benefit from the payment to the
agent, nor did the agent act at the behest of the employer.
However, the court laid emphasis on the fact that the purser's act was not a breach
of his duty toward the ship company. "The testimony of the purser, on which defendant's conviction hinges, is that the purser had notified his superior of the fact that
his practice was carried on, but that 'the superior gave me no answer, and he didn't
say yes or no.' The reason on account of which no reply was given is evidently that the
9
interest of the United States Lines was not regarded as being involved."
In addition, the court held: "Since money was not paid to influence the purser to
perform an act involving discretion in the conduct of his employer's business, defendant
has not been proved to be guilty of the crime which is defined by section 439 of the
o
The conclusion that the employee's act did not involve the exercise of
Penal Law.'
discretion in the conduct of his employer's business is based on the evidence disclosed in
the record. It was indicated there that the United States Lines did not confine the
delivery of its passenger manifests to the federal customs, immigration, and public
health authorities, but also caused them to be sent to certain newspapers, hereby publicizing the manifests. The fact that they were given publicity in such a manner emphasizes that the purser's act in making them available to the defendant involved no
exercise of discretion in the conduct of the business of the company. Jacob's conviction,
affirmed by the Appellate Division,"1 was therefore reversed.

PROCEDURE-IN ACTION BROUGHT AGAINST THE STATE OF NEW YORK, COURT OF CLAIMS
AcT HELD TO PROHIrr STATE FROM ImPLEAnING THIRD PATY DFENDANT-The Ap-

pellate Division, Third Department, has ruled that the limited jurisdiction of the Court
of Claims precludes the State of New York from impleading a third-party defendant
against whom the State could assert a claim for indemnification at common law or under
1
the terms of its contract.
5 Id. at 191, 192, 24 N. Y. S. 2d 683, 687.
6 Id. at 192, 24 N. Y. S. 2d 683, 687.
7 Id. at 191, 24 N. Y. S. 2d 683, 687.
8 Ibid.
9 See note 1, supra, at 318, 130 N. E. 2d 636, 637.
10 Ibid.
21 285 App. Div. 938, 139 N. Y. S. 2d 28 (1st Dep't 1955).
1 Horoch v. State of New York, 286 App. Div. 303, 143 N. Y. S. 2d 327 (3d Dep't
1955).

239
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The State of New York entered into a contract with the Lachow Demolition Corporation to demolish certain buildings in Bronx County. The claimant was employed

by the corporation to assist in the work, and while so employed was injured by an
explosion. Subsequently, the worker brought an action against the State of New York
in the Court of Claims, alleging that the State had failed to provide adequate supervision
over the project, and had thereby permitted a dangerous condition to exist. The State
moved to implead the employer as a third-party defendant, on the theory of indemnification. The motion was denied and the State appealed.

At the common law, the State, as sovereign, was immune from tort and contract
liability, and no suit could be maintained against the State unless it granted consent to
be sued. In most American jurisdictions, such consent has been granted, in a more or
less limited form, by statutes which provide for special procedures or create special
courts for particular causes of action.2 In New York State a special tribunal, the Court
of Claims, was created to determine the liability of the State. 3
The Court of Claims Act provides that the liability of the State shall be determined
"in accordance with the same rules of law as are applied to actions in the Supreme
Court. .. ."4 Claimants appearing before the Court of Claims are guaranteed substantially the same rights granted to parties appearing before the Supreme Court of the State
of New York, with the important exception that the liability of the State is determined
solely by the court sitting without a jury.5 A litigant, however, is not deprived of any
of his constitutional rights, for the State, by permitting itself to be sued, extends a
privilege which it may qualify as it sees fit.
The causes of action over which the Court of Claims may exercise jurisdiction are
set forth in Section 9 of the Court of Claims Act. This section authorizes claims against
the State, counterclaims by the State against the claimant, and the interpleader of parties
necessary for the complete determination of a claim or counterclaim.8 No mention is
made in the section of impleader jurisdiction.
Although interpleader and impleader are both methods of bringing new parties into
the action, there is a distinction between the two remedies. Interpleader is the procedure by which one who may be exposed to multiple liability may require adverse
claimants to litigate their claims in one action. 7 The procedure of impleader does not
seek to resolve adverse claims, but is merely the means by which the ultimate primary
liability of a third party may be settled.8 Under the clear language of the Court of
Claims Act the remedy of interpleader alone is permitted.
The State urged in this case that it should be allowed to implead the employer in
the same manner as the United States may implead third parties in the federal District
Courts. The court, however, held that the limitation of the statutory language did not
allow this procedure, further pointing out that an impleaded party is guaranteed the right
under both the federal and state constitutions to have claims against him determined by
a jury. 9 By virtue of the Federal Tort Claims Act the National Government has waived
immunity from suit, and now permits the federal District Courts to determine claims
against the United States for personal injuries.1 o Through this procedure the Fe'deral
2 PROSSER, HANDBoox or THE LAW OF TORTS, 770-780 (2d ed. St. Paul 1955).
3 N. Y. CT. CL. Acr § 8.
4 N. Y. CT. CL. ACT §§ 8. 9(9).
5 Id., § 12(3).
6 Id., § 9(2), 9(3), 9(6).

7 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 285.

8 Id., § 193a.
9 U. S. CoNsT. art. VII; N. Y. CoNsT. art. XII.
10 62 STAT. 983 (1948), 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346(b), 1402(b), 2402, 2674 (1952).
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Government subjects itself to suit in a court of general jurisdiction, where a third party
defendant may demand and obtain a trial by jury."1 On the other hand, the Court of

Claims Act created a special tribunal of limited jurisdiction where the rights of the
litigant are determined by the court sitting without a jury.' 2 Therefore, any attempt by
the State to implead a third party in the Court of Claims would work a deprivation

of that party's constitutional right to a jury trial in common-law money actions.
This decision appears to interpret the Court of Claims Act as prohibiting the State
of New York from impleading third parties in the Court of Claims, and limiting the
State to its right to bring a separate action for indemnification, against the person sought

to be impleaded, in a court of general jurisdiction.

LAW-PRIOR FALSE STATEMENT AS To AssETs MADE TO REVENUE AGENTS
HELD INADMISSIBLE TO PROVE INTENT IN TAX FRAuD PRosEcuTioN.-Defendant was conEviDENcE-TAX

victed in a United States District Court in Alabama of wilfully attempting to evade and
defeat federal income taxes for the years 1945, 1946 and 1947 by filing fraudulent returns.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that while
there was sufficient evidence to submit the case to the jury, certain evidence that defendant offered to compromise a tax liability for the years 1924 through 1934, as well
as an untrue sworn statement which accompanied the compromise offer, were inadmissible, and the admission of this evidence constituted prejudicial error, calling for reversal
and a new trial.'
The evidence tended to show that defendant, in his bakery books, overstated the
amount expended for merchandise by approximately $17,300.00. No invoices or other
records of such purchases could be produced. Testimony of a revenue agent revealed
that various deposits in appellant's peronal account and in bank accounts to the credit
of his wife and daughter, plus the purchase of United States Savings Bonds, corresponded
perfectly by dates in each care to the "purchases" as noted in the bakery books.
The government also produced circumstantial evidence to support charges that
appellant had made substantial understatements of cash receipts and overstatements of
delivery expenses for the years involved. These claims were in part supported by the
direct testimony of appellant's bookkeeper.
In order to show defendant's criminal intent to evade payment of taxes for 1945,
1946 and 1947, the government was permitted to prove, over defendant's objection, that
he had submitted an offer of $750.00 to compromise a tax liability amounting to $3,100.68
which he had incurred for the years 1924 through 1932, and that at the same time he
had made a sworn statement that he borrowed $750.00 from relatives, which statement
he later admitted to be untrue; and that other facts relating to his assets and liabilities
contained in the compromise offer were likewise untrue. The Court of Appeals held the
admission of this evidence to be reversable error.
The rules governing the admission of evidence of prior acts to show a present intent
have evolved in the law, both civil and criminal, from a very strict rule at common
law which had as its maxim: "Let no similar facts be admitted."'2 As a general proposi11 United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U. S. 543, 71 S. Ct. 399, 95 L. Ed. 523
(1951).
12 See note 5, supra.
1 Lloyd v. United States, 226 F. 2d 9 (5th Cir. 1955).
2 Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 HARv. L.
REV. 988 (1938).
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tion, this common-law concept is still the law. As one New York court has put it,
"One may not be convicted of one crime on proof that he probably is guilty because he
committed another crime." 3 This rule, however, has various exceptions which have been
found necessary, in order to show scienter in certain crimes. The strict rule was relaxed
in about 18404 because of the special difficulty of proving guilty knowledge in cases of
uttering counterfeit and forged currency and documents, and in cases of receiving stolen
property. For these two particular criminal acts, it became important to prove guilty
knowledge in connection with the doing of the act, in order to negative the possibility of
good faith in the transaction in question, and it was held proper to show that the accused
had been guilty of similar offenses on prior occasions.5 Today, evidence of prior criminal
acts may also be admitted to prove intent in the crimes of forgery and obtaining money
or goods by false pretenses. 6
Many jurisdictions today have announced that they will not restrict evidence of
prior acts to cases of the four crimes listed above, but will rather be guided by general
principles of competence, materiality, and logical connection. A Washington court has
laid down the rule that "in prosecution for any crime, whether felony or misdemeanor,
in which the gravamen of the offense is not in the doing of the deed, but in the faith of
which it was done, evidence of other similar contemporaneous offenses is admissible on
the issue of intent." 7 A Minnesota court has announced that it will, in its discretion, look
at prior acts in relation to their remoteness both in deed and/or in point of time.8
In the instant case, the federal Court of Appeals, after considering this persuasive
authority, felt that the admission in evidence of appellant's prior acts was error, because
those acts were not similar enough to the acts charged, but were so remote as to be
lacking in evidentiary value.9 The admission of evidence of these prior acts in the lower
court was held to be highly prejudicial, for it indicated to the jury that the defendant
had cheated on his income taxes over a period of years, and furthermore, was unworthy
of belief because he had made misstatements in his offer to compromise. The court was
unwilling to say that without such inadmissible evidence the jury might not have reached
a different verdict,' 0 and, therefore, reversed the judgment of conviction.

PROCERE-IN ACTION AGAINST CITY, INJURED WIFE NOT BARRED FROm DiscRETIONARY
ExmTsioN oF FILmN T!rsr BECAUSE HUSBAND COULD HAvE FIED ON HER BEIIALF
1
WITIN NnETY DAYs-The Court of Appeals, in reversing orders below which denied
an application for extension of the statutory 90-day period for filing a notice of claim,
(which is a condition precedent to the commencement of a negligence action against
the City of New York) 2 where the injured party is physically incapable of filing said
3 People v. Goldstein, 295 N. Y. 21, 65 N. E. 2d 169 (1946).
4 See note 2, supra; Lockwood v. Doane, 107 Ill. 235 (1883); Davis v. State, 54
Neb. 177, 74 N. W. 599 (1898) ; State v. Lyle, 125 S. C. 406, 118 S. E. 803 (1923) ; State
v. Baugh, 200 Iowa 1225, 206 N. W. 250 (1925).
5 McKusick, Techniques in Proof of Other Crime to Show Guilty Knowledge and
Intent, 24 IowA L. Rxv. 471 (1938).
6 RICHARDSON, EvIDENCE, § 148 (7th ed. by Prince, Brooklyn 1948).
7 State v. Raub, 103 Wash..214, 173 Pac. 1094 (1918).
8 Hale v. Life Indemnity & Investment Co., 65 Minn. 548, 68 N. W. 182 (1896).
9 2 WiGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 302 (3d ed. Boston 1942) ; Wolcher v. United States, 200
F. 2d 493 (1952).
10 Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U. S. 750, 66 S. Ct. 1239, 90 L. Ed. 1557 (1946).
1 285 App. Div. 1085, 140 N. Y. S. 2d 140 (1st Dep't 1955).
2 N. Y. GEN. MmrN. L. § S0-e(1).
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notice, because of hospitalization, the fact that a spouse could have filed the notice
during the 90-day period does not bar the injured party from a discretionary extension
of the filing period. 3
Mrs. Rosenberg and her two infant children were injured on July 3, 1954, in an
automobile accident on the lower level of the Manhattan Bridge. The negligence alleged
against the City of New York was that it permitted the traveled surface to become
disintegrated so as to allow the smooth, slippery metal portions beneath the covering of
the roadway to be exposed, causing the driving surface to become dangerous. The 90day period 4 for filing the notice of claim expired on October 1, 1954. Notices of claim
for the three parties were filed on November 16, 1954. The Supreme Court, at Special
Term, denied all three applications to extend the time for filing, stating that the husband
and father was capable of presenting the claims in behalf of the claimants within the
permissible period. The Appellate Division reversed in regard to the infant claimants,
but affirmed in regard to the mother, agreeing that her husband could have filed the
notice in her behalf within the statutory period.
Section S0-e(l) of the General Municipal Law provides in part that "in any case
* . . where a notice of claim is required ...
as a condition precedent to the commencement of an action ... in tort ... it shall be given within 90 days after the claim arises."
In this connection, section SO-e(5) of the General Municipal Law provides that the 90day notice may be extended for not more than a year "where the claimant is an infant,
or is mentally or physically incapacitated and by reason of such disability fails to serve
'5
a notice of claim . . . within the time limited therefor.
The issue presented by the appeal was whether the 90-day period permitted by
section S0-e(1) of the General Municipal Law6 should have been extended for the filing
of a claim by the mother, as a result of her incapacity caused by the injuries she
sustained in the accident.
The Appellate Division had found that appellant's husband should have filed for her
since she was incapable of doing so herself.7 The Court of Appeals, in reversing the
Appellate Division, held that the statute does not require that someone else act for a
person physically incapacitated, within the 90-day period, and said that "whether the
90-day period is to be extended does not, at least in the case of an adult not adjudged
to be mentally incompetent, depend upon whether there is someone other than the
claimant who can act in the matter prior to the expiration of a year." s
The law of New York, on the question of an extension of the statutory period for
filing a notice of claim, appears to be well settled as to what extent of injury will bring
the claimant within the statutory exception. The injuries alleged by the claimant must
be proved to be such as to prevent him from filing. Thus, notices of claim filed against
the City after the expiration of the 90-day period have been sustained where the injured
party was either mentally or physically disabled from the time of the accident to a time
beyond the 90-day period.9 On the other hand, such claims have been denied when
3 Application of Rosenberg, 309 N. Y. 304 (1955).
4 See note 2 supra.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 See note 1, supra.
8 See note 3, supra, at 306.
9 Application of Colehammer, 276 App. Div. 809, 93 N. Y. S. 2d 499 (Ist Dep't
1949); Application of Huntley, 201 Misc. 426, 106 N. Y. S. 2d 195 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. Co.
1951); Application of Sullivan, 282 App. Div. 1097, 126 N. Y. S. 2d 438 (1st Dep't
1953); Moore v. City of New York, 276 App. Div. 585, 96 N. Y. S. 2d 324 (1st Dep't
1950); Kraus v. Board of Education of the City of New York, 199 Misc. 505, 103
N. Y. S. 2d 939 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. Co. 1951).
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filed after the expiration of the 90-day period, when the physical or mental incapacity
of the claimant was not substantiated by sufficient evidence,' 0 where the injury was
such that the claimant had been back at her employment for at least eight months prior
to filing her claim;1 where the claimant's arm was in a cast for a portion of the
statutory period;' 2 where the claimant made seven trips to the hospital as an out-patient
three months after his discharge. 13
However, unlike the above cases, there was in the instant case no question of the
claimant's incapacity to file. The question was whether claimant's husband, who
concededly could have filed, should have done so, and whether claimant was precluded
because he had not. The Court of Appeals saw no justification in the statutory language
for such an interpretation. Further, the court pointed out that section 50-e(5) is drafted
in the alternative, so that either infancy or physical or mental incapacity provides a
foundation upon which the courts, with their discretionary power, may act. Therefore,
reasoned the Court of Appeals, the Appellate Division, having extended the time of the
infants, was in error in refusing to extend the appellant's time likewise.
The injured party will not be deprived of his day in court merely because another
could have filed the notice of claim on his behalf within the statutory period, while
he was in fact physically incapacitated from doing so.
10 Sullivan v. Town of Babylon, 277 App. Div. 791, 97 N. Y. S. 2d 240 (2d Dep't
1950), aff'd 302 N. Y. 609, 96 N. E. 2d 898 (1951); Freimer v. City of New York, 279
App. Div. 1084, 112 N. Y. S. 2d 660 (1st Dep't 1952).
11 McGuire v. City of New York, 116 N. Y. S. 2d 163 (1st Dep't 1952).
12 Franco v. City of New York, 270 App. Div. 1050, 63 N. Y. S. 2d 291 (1st Dep't
1946).
'3 Application of Babinski, 279 App. Div. 871, 110 N. Y. S. 2d 225 (1st Dep't 1952).

